The Extraordinary Career of Tsarevich Kudai Kul/Peter
in the Context of Relations Between Muscovy and Kazan’

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The sources tell us of close relations between Tatar and Muscovite elites in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. During this time, more than 60 Jochid princes as well as numerous members of the Tatar aristocracies entered the service of the Muscovite ruler. By the seventeenth century, according to one source, those of Tatar descent constituted 17% of the Muscovite ruling class, but the actual percentage may have been higher, comparable to the 21% of indigenous “Russian” descent. Although Tatars and those of Tatar descent who were of lower social standing experienced various types of discrimination and prejudice from Churchmen and local officials, we find no direct evidence of either discrimination or prejudice against Tatars of the ruling class who converted. If anything, it is exactly the opposite, as certain individuals were granted privileges and honors that were unusual for anyone in Muscovite service.

One of the more extraordinary episodes of crossover during the time concerns the tsarevich Kudai Kul (Kaidakul), who was taken prisoner in the attack on Kazan’ by the forces of Ivan III in


1487. After eighteen years of “captivity,” Kudai Kul decided to leave Islam. According to the official Zapis’ of the event, he asked “in tears” at a private audience with Vasilii III to be allowed to become a Christian. Afanasii, archimandrite of the Spasskii Monastery, upon instructions from Metropolitan Simon, baptized him “Petr Ibraimov” (Abreimov, Obreimovich) on December 21, 1505, in the Moskva River. One week later, Kudai Kul/Peter pledged his loyalty to Vasilii III and, promised to have no independent dealings with Kazan’. Within a month (January 25, 1506), he married Evdokhiia Ivanovna, the grand prince’s sister. According to the Novgorod IV Chronicle, Vasilii assigned him Goroden, Klin, and five villages close to Moscow for his maintenance. This information is unconfirmed by other sources, but it was common practice to grant lands and towns

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to prominent Tatar converts. Kudai Kul/Peter became one of the people closest to Vasilii III. And the historian A. A. Zimin even proposed that Vasilii, in the first version of his Testament (1509), tapped him as his heir. When Vasilii took Pskov in 1510, Kudai Kul/Peter was with him. In the winter of 1512–13, when Vasilii marched against Smolensk the first time, Kudai Kul/Peter and Vasilii’s brother Dmitrii Ivanovich accompanied him. The Razriadnaia kniga lists Kudai Kul/Peter as second in command of the main Muscovite regiment behind Grand Prince

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6 For a partial list of such converts and their land grants from 1492 to 1618, see “‘Rospis’, khto byl na Moskve tsarei i tsarevichev roznykh zemel, i khto byl Cherkaskikh i Nagaiskich murz i pri kotorom gosudare i khto v kakom chinu byl’ za XV–XVII vv.,” ed. S. A. Belokurov, Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete (ChOIDR), vol. 191, 1899, pt. 5: Smes’, pp. 5–8; for 1623 to 1638, see “XXXIX. 1638, avgusta 16–17. Po chelobitnoi Ivana Dorna, priniavshogo pravoslavie, o dache emu dvora, dlia zhit’ia,” Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka (RIB), vol. 8, cols. 278–284.

7 A. A. Zimin, “Ivan Groznyi i Simeon Bekbulatovich v 1575 g.,” Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta, vyp. 80: Iz istorii Tatarii, vol. 4, 1970, pp. 146–147; see also A. A. Zimin, Rossiia na poroge novogo vremen (Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Rossii pervoi treti XVI v.), Moscow: Mysl’, 1972, p. 99. A. A. Zimin, V kanun groznykh potriasenii. Predposylki pervoi Krest’ianskoi voiny v Rossii, Moscow: Mysl’, 1986, p. 25. Since Vasilii’s first testament is no longer extant, Zimin’s proposal is speculative. He bases his argument on three considerations: Vasilii’s having no son to succeed him; his poor relationship with his brothers, who would presumably be next in line; and his excellent relationship with the next closest male of the family, his brother-in-law Kudai Kul/Peter. Vasilii had four younger brothers at the time: Iurii (d. 1536), Andrei (d. 1537), Dmitrii (d. 1521), and Semën (d. 1518).


Vasilii himself. It was during that campaign, apparently when her husband was away, that Evdokhiia died, February 1513. From this point on, the Razriadnaia kniga reports only when Grand Prince Vasilii and Kudai Kul/Peter were apart: “А на Москве оставил князь великий без себя зятя своею царевича Петр Обреимовича” (And the Grand Prince remained at Moscow without his brother-in-law Peter Obreimovich). In 1513 and 1514, when Vasilii III campaigned against Smolensk a second and third time, he left Kudai Kul/Peter in charge of Moscow along with his own brother Andrei Ivanovich Staritskii. Sigismund von Herberstein, Imperial ambassador to the Muscovite court, in a marginal note in his so-called “Autobiography” provides further testimony of Kudai Kul/Peter’s high status at the court. He writes about having dinner with the grand prince both upon arrival in and departure from Moscow in 1517: “Two of his brothers [Iurii and Semen] also sat there, one on the right, the other on the left. There was also a Tatar khan’s son, who was baptized and had married the grand prince’s sister.”

10 “Drevneishaia razriadnaia kniga” (Miliukov), p. 50; Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1605 gg., vol. 1, p. 126; Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598 gg., p. 49.


12 “Drevneishaia razriadnaia kniga” (Miliukov), p. 54; Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1605 gg., vol. 1, p. 134.

13 “Drevneishaia razriadnaia kniga” (Miliukov), p. 56; Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598 gg., pp. 53, 54; Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1605 gg., vol. 1, p. 138. The texts go on to state that on two occasions Vasilii’s brother Dmitrii was ordered to stay in Serpukhov.


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of Vasilii’s brothers. 15 In 1521, Kudai Kul/Peter, as namestnik of Moscow, organized its defense against the Crimean Tatar attack of that year. 16 When he died in March 1523, after what appears to have been a distinguished career in Muscovite service, his body was buried in the Cathedral of the Archangel Michael (Arkhangel’skii sobor) in Moscow, 17 an extremely high Christian honor for a nice Muslim boy from Kazan’.

Thus, we have a Tatar tsarevich rising to a position of prominence in a Christian grand duchedom and, upon his death, receiving the honor of having his body entombed in one of the most prestigious churches in the capital. In the remainder of this article, I will discuss his genealogical descent, speculate about the context of his rise to influence in Muscovy, and, to a certain extent, ponder his heritage.

Since Kudai Kul was a tsarevich of the Kazan’ Khanate, his immediate ancestry is closely connected with the circumstances of the founding of that khanate and its early relations with Muscovy (see Figure 1). Kudai Kul’s great-grandfather, Ulu Mehmed, became khan of the Qipchaq Khanate in 1419 (although his position was contested until at least 1427). Ulu Mehmed was descended from Chingis Khan through Toğay-Timur, the brother of Batu and son of Joći. It was Ulu


16 “Drevneishaia razriadnaia kniga” (Miliukov), p. 73; Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1605 gg., vol. 1, p. 183; Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1598 gg., p. 69; Gerbershtein, Zapiski, p. 173; Herberstein, Notes upon Russia, vol. 2, pp. 61–62. There is, however, no mention in the chronicles of his leading the defense of the city.

*Before marrying Ibrahim, Nur Sultan had been married to Halil

**Figure 1**
Mehmed whom, Grand Prince Vasilii II Vasil’evich and his uncle Iurii Dmitrievich went to see in Sarai in 1431 to decide the grand princely succession.\(^\text{18}\) In 1435, Küčük Mehmed ousted his distant cousin Ulu Mehmed and declared himself to be khan of Qipchaq. It was this ouster that led to the establishment of the Kazan’ Khanate. We can agree with Prof. Pelenski’s statement that “the formation of the Kazan Khanate cannot be marked by any specific date; it should rather be looked upon as a continual process which started with Ulu Mehmets’s exit from the Golden Horde and ended in 1445.”\(^\text{19}\) Ulu Mehmed fled north with a contingent of troops, and defeated a Rus’ force at Belev sent to dislodge it on December 5, 1437.\(^\text{20}\) In 1439, from July 3 to July 13, Ulu Mehmed besieged Moscow.\(^\text{21}\) In 1445, this great-grandfather of Kudai Kul captured Vasilii


\(^{20}\) *PSRL*, vol. 5, p. 267; vol. 6, p. 150; vol. 8, p. 107; vol. 12, pp. 24–25; vol. 18, pp. 188–189; vol. 20, p. 240; vol. 23, pp. 149–150; vol. 24, p. 183; vol. 25, p. 260; vol. 26, pp. 192–193; vol. 27, pp. 106–107, 272; vol. 28, pp. 101–102, 268; vol. 39, p. 145; *Ioasafoskaia letopis’, p. 28; and Ustuzhskii letopisnyi svod*, p. 78. See also Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia*, p. 301. Some chronicles date the Battle of Belev to the fall of 1436, but that seems to be a mistake.

II, the grandfather of Kudai Kul’s future wife, at the Battle of Suzdal’ and held him for ransom.\textsuperscript{22} The next year, Mahmud (Mahmeduk), the son of Ulu Mehmed and future grandfather of Kudai Kul, claimed the throne of Kazan’ after the death of his own father.\textsuperscript{23} Perhaps because of this action, we find that both Kasim and Yakup, the brothers of Mahmud, go over to Muscovite service in 1447.\textsuperscript{24} Subsequently, Ivan III gave Kasim a town on the Oka River, Meshcherskii Gorodok (which later became the basis of the Kasimov Khanate), as a reward for his fighting against both Dmitrii Shemiaka and Kasim’s brother Mahmud.\textsuperscript{25} And in 1468, Ivan supported
Kasim in his abortive attempt to become khan.\textsuperscript{26}

After Mahmud died in 1466,\textsuperscript{27} his eldest son, Kudai Kul’s uncle, Halil reigned as khan for less than a year. Then Ibrahim, Kudai Kul’s father, took over in 1467 and reigned as khan until 1479. Kudai Kul was the third son from the first marriage of Ibrahim, that is, to Fatima. Kudai Kul’s eldest brother, Ilham (or Ali) came to be khan after the death of Ibrahim in 1479, and reigned until 1485 when he was ousted by his (and Kudai Kul’s) younger half-brother Mehmed Emin. After the death of Kudai Kul’s mother Fatima, his father, Ibrahim, married Nur Sultan.\textsuperscript{28}

According to Herberstein, Nur Sultan had previously been married to Halil, but upon his death she married Ibrahim, “who by this means gained possession of the kingdom.”\textsuperscript{29} From this marriage, two sons were born, Mehmed Emin and Abdüllätif. After the death of Khan Ibrahim,

\textsuperscript{26} In the campaign the following summer (1469), the chronicles report that the wife of Kasim, “who was also the mother of Ibrahim, the Khan of Kazan,” said she was allowed by Ivan III to go to Ibrahim on a peace mission. \textit{PSRL}, vol. 8, pp. 156–157; vol. 12, p. 122; vol. 18, p. 122; vol. 25, p. 283; vol. 26, p. 228; vol. 27, p. 127; vol. 28, pp. 120, 289. For this identification to be accurate, the wife of Mahmud would have had to marry Kasim after Mahmud’s death with the probable purpose of legitimizing Kasim’s claim to the throne of Kazan’. Keenan argues that “[t]he Shirins, the leading \textit{karachi} clan, were probably responsible for” sending Mahmud’s widow to marry Kasim, because they wanted “as khan someone who was \textit{not} well connected with any significant local interests.” Edward L. Keenan, Jr., “Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy,” \textit{Slavic Review}, vol. 26, 1967, p. 556.

\textsuperscript{27} For a \textit{yarlik} from Mahmud dated 1466, which would seem to indicate that he reigned as khan until he died, see T[ibor] Halasi-Kun, “Monuments de la langue tatare de Kazan,” \textit{Analecta Orientalia memoriae Alexandri Csoma de Körös dicata (= Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica, vol. 5)}, ed. L[ajos] Ligeti, Budapest, vol. 1, 1942, pp. 145–146. See also Pelenski, \textit{Russia and Kazan}, p. 333, fn. 3.

\textsuperscript{28} On her life, see M. Berezhkov, “Nur-Sultan, tsaritsa krymskaia (istoriko-biograficheskii ocherk),” \textit{Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii}, no. 27, 1897, pp. 1–17.

Nur Sultan married the khan of the Crimean Khanate, Mengli Girey. Nur Sultan had a distinguished lineage too, being a Nogai princess and the great-granddaughter of Edigei, who had besieged Moscow in 1408. After her marriage to Mengli Girey in late 1486 or early 1487, both she and her new husband supported the claim of Mehmed Emin, her son by İbrahim, to be khan against the claim of İlham, İbrahim’s son by his first wife Fatima.

The Muscovite court elite, in their discussions with Herberstein, presented an account of these successions to the throne of Kazan’ according to which the grand prince, from the reign of İlham on, acted as a khan-maker. In each case, the grand prince is depicted as being the one who installed the incumbent on the throne, then being disappointed as that khan began to listen to evil advisers, do unjust things, and act in a way that was inimical to Muscovite interests. Then the grand prince would replace him with another khan, until that person began to listen to evil advisers, do unjust things, etc., and the pattern would be repeated. In 1521, Vasilii sent a slightly modified version of this account to Sultan Suleyman. And in 1535, the idea that the Muscovite grand prince was the sole installer of khans in Kazan’ “from the beginning” (из пачала) was reasserted by Vasilii III in a diplomatic mission he sent to Lithuania. We can, of course, understand this interpretation as a biased and misleading one. Other considerations,
besides the grand prince’s whim, came into play. Our sources provide broad indications that the most prominent of these were the Muscovite grand prince’s relations with (a) the local Kazan’ magnates (in particular, the qarači beys and leaders of the quriltai); (b) the Crimean khan; and (c) the Nogais, who could provide military and diplomatic support or opposition.34

Before 1487, the Muscovite grand prince does not seem to have had much influence on who was khan of Kazan’. From 1487 to 1518, with the exception of the reign of Abdüllâtif (i.e., between 1497 and 1502) the Muscovite grand prince and the Crimean khan were in agreement that Mehmed Emin should be khan. In 1518, that cooperation broke down when Vasilii supported as khan Shah Ali who had been chosen by the Kazan’ qarači beys and quriltai. But that action ultimately led to conflict between Vasilii and Mehmed Girey, who had succeeded his father Mengli Girey as the Crimean khan. As a result of Mehmed Girey’s response, the installation of khans favorable to the Crimean khan occurred almost continually until the conquest of Kazan’ by Ivan IV in October 1552. Three months after that, in January 1553 in a letter to Nogai Mirza Ismail, Ivan declared that Kazan’ had been a yurt of the Muscovite ruler from the beginning,35 just as Mehmet Girey had claimed in 1521 that it was the Crimean khan’s yurt (see below). The counter claims of Muscovite and Crimean rulers as to whose yurt Kazan’ was became further complicated in 1524 when Iskander, envoy from the Ottoman Empire,


claimed Kazan’ was the yurt of Sultan Suleyman. In fact, before the conquest of 1552, we have only four instances when the Muscovite ruler supported Kazan’s choice of khan without the approval of the Crimean khan; each of these instances was challenged and short lived—1497 (for five years), 1518 (for three years), 1532 (for three years), and 1546 (for one month).

In 1486, İlham, apparently with the support of his brothers Melik-Tagir and Kudai Kul, regained the throne briefly until the following year, when Mehmed Emin, now with the military help of Ivan III as well, gained it back until 1496. It was at this time (1487) when the khan’s throne exchanged hands that Kudai Kul and his older brother Melik-Tagir found themselves prisoners of the Muscovite grand prince. We can suppose that these two younger brothers of İlham were kept incommunicado to prevent them from attempting to gain the khanship back from the Muscovite-supported Mehmed Emin. At this time, Ivan III and Mengli Girey had close relations; they routinely referred to each other as “brother” in their diplomatic correspondence. And Nur Sultan, by extension, designated herself a “sister” of Ivan III.

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38 SARIO, vol. 41, no. 1, p. 1; vol. 41, no. 1, p. 6; vol. 41, no. 16, p. 59; vol. 41, no. 27, p. 100; vol. 41, no. 48, p. 220; vol. 95, no. 2, p. 25.

We can only speculate what Melik-Tagir’s and Kudai Kul’s “imprisonments” were like since we have no evidence about them, except that Kudai Kul was held in Rostov under the supervision of the archbishop. It was likely that, as tsareviches, they were treated with the respect due their rank. In the ever-changing grasslands of steppe diplomacy, Ivan III might find one or the other useful as a potential candidate and presumably favorable to Muscovite interests should either one come to the throne of Kazan’. Ivan III would not want to alienate them to such an extent that they would turn against him. Nor were they Tatar serving princes, that is, a Tatar prince who provided military service to the Muscovite grand prince (although remaining Muslim and thus outside the Muscovite mestnichestvo system). We can only speculate why Kudai Kul did not (or was not allowed to) convert to Christianity sooner. Herberstein tells us that Melik-Tagir remained Muslim until his death, although two of his sons, Fedor and Vasilii, were registered in Muscovite service (and thus were baptized) by 1513. Again, it would make sense, from the point of view of steppe diplomacy, for Melik-Tagir and Kudai Kul to remain Muslim in case Ivan III wanted to support the candidacy of either one to become the khan of Kazan’. In theory, it was sufficient for them to be Chingizids and Jochids for them to claim the throne regardless of their religion at the time. But it would have been more acceptable to the quriltai and divan of qarači beys in Kazan’ were the candidate for the throne Muslim like themselves.

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Although Muscovite troops took part in the 1487 capture of Kazan’, Ivan III could not lay claim to become the ruler of Kazan’ since he was neither a Chingizid nor a tsar (= khan) nor Muslim.

In 1497, Mehmed Emin fled to Muscovy to escape an attack by Mamuk, the Khan of Tiumen’, who, with a force of Nogai troops, claimed the throne of Kazan’ for himself. Ivan III sent Muscovite troops against Mamuk and ousted him from Kazan’. According to the Rus’ chronicles, the qaraçï bey of Kazan’ then asked for Ivan to send someone other than Mehmed Emin as khan. Since Ivan was still on friendly relations with Mengli Girey he chose the other son of Nur Sultan by İbrahim, that is, Abdüllâtif, rather than either Melik-Tagir or Kudai Kul, İbrahim’s sons by his first wife Fatima. Ivan granted Mehmed Emin the towns of Koshira, Serpukhov, and Khotun’ for his livelihood. But this arrangement did not sit well with Nur Sultan who wrote to Ivan in August 1498 opposing the placement of her younger son, Abdüllâtif, on the throne in the place of her older son, Mehmed Emin.

In January 1502, according to the chronicles, Ivan III deposed Abdüllâtif and restored Mehmed Emin. Both Mengli Girey and Nur Sultan wrote to Ivan supporting the change.


44 SRIO, vol. 41, no. 58, p. 272.


Mehmed Emin, however, after becoming khan again, began to adopt a policy independent of Muscovy. By June 24, 1505, an open break occurred between Kazan’ and Muscovy when hostilities broke out.\(^{47}\) In October of that year, Ivan III died, to be succeeded by his son Vasili III, who, in addition to the grand princely throne of Muscovy, inherited the conflict with Kazan’.

It was apparently at this point that a change in strategy occurred in regard to Kudai Kul’s status. Instead of keeping Kudai Kul Muslim, and, thus, better situated to become the khan of Kazan’ at some point, Vasili III seems to have decided it would be better to have Kudai Kul directly in his service fighting as a Muscovite. Pelenski has proposed “that Vasiliij may have entertained the idea of a dynastic union between Kazan and Muscovy (founded on an appropriate Orthodox marriage), which would serve as an intermediary step before the complete incorporation of the Khanate would be accomplished.”\(^{48}\) The idea of a dynastic union was a possibility and one that then would have been dependent on the installation of Kudai Kul/Peter or, should he have one, his son as khan by force of Muscovite arms in order to obtain compliance from the Kazan’ magnates and the maintenance of occupation troops there in order to fend off counterattacks by the khans of Tiumen’ or Sibir’ and the Crimea as well as their Nogai allies.

What role Kudai Kul played in the decision to place himself in allegiance to Vasili III we do not know. Perhaps Kudai Kul had a sincere conversion, as the Zapis’ concerning it indicates, although the timing of the conversion, just after Vasili became grand prince, raises doubts in the


\(^{48}\) Pelenski, Russia and Kazan, p. 261.
skeptical historian’s mind. We also have no evidence of any relationship between Kudai Kul and Vasilii before this. Had they become friends? It would seem likely given Kudai Kul’s fast rise in Muscovite service and the trust Vasilii put in him from the very beginning of his conversion.

In December 1505, within two months of Vasilii’s accession to the throne, Kudai Kul converted to Christianity and entered Muscovite service. By January 1506, he married Vasilii’s sister Evdokhiia Ivanovna, and we can suppose he took part in the unsuccessful campaigns against his half-brother Mehmed Emin during the spring and summer of 1506. Peace between Vasilii and Mehmed Emin came in 1507, which the chronicles present as a victory for Muscovy. More likely it resulted in a compromise settlement not entirely to Muscovy’s advantage.

In order better to understand what was going on in regard to Muscovy’s relations with the Kazan’ Khanate (or perhaps unintentionally making it more confusing), we can borrow from international relations theory. Those political scientists who subscribe to the systemic hypothesis (called institutionalists) hold that behavior in any inter-state system is a function of three factors: hierarchy of prestige among the states, which ultimately rests on economic and military power; the grammar or set of rules that influences interactions among those states; and distribution of power among various coalitions. According to this theory, the distribution of power is characterized by one of three structures: (1) hegemony, in which a single state dominates the other states in the system; (2) bipolarity, in which two states control interactions within and between their respective spheres of influence; and (3) multipolarity or balance of power, in which

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49 The chronicles report that a “tsarevich” accompanied one regiment but do not provide a name. *PSRL*, vol. 6, pp. 51, 245; vol. 8, p. 246; vol. 13, p. 4; vol. 20, p. 377; vol. 26, p. 298; vol. 28, p. 339; vol. 39, p. 177; and *Ioasafovskaiia letopis’*, p. 149. Presumably this was Kudai Kul/Peter.
at least three, and preferably five, states affect one another’s actions through diplomatic maneuvers, shifting alliances, and open conflict.\(^{50}\) We can also apply, in a slightly modified form, John LeDonne’s geopolitical interpretation of Imperial Russian foreign policy based on a synthesis of Geoffrey Parker’s “core areas” and Owen Lattimore’s “frontier zones” as well as Halford Mackinder’s “heartland” theory.\(^{51}\)

Thus, around the year 1500, the western steppe area of the heartland saw a balance of power among five states of relatively low economic and military might: the Crimean Khanate, the Great Horde, the Kazan’ Khanate, Muscovy, and the Khanate of Tiumen’ (soon to be replaced by the Khanate of Sibir’). These states occupied a frontier zone between three relatively distant major powers or core areas: the Ottoman Empire, Poland-Lithuania, and Safavid Persia, none of which was able to exert hegemony over this area. Muscovy found itself in a potentially precarious position threatened by a possible coalition of the Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania. But Kazan’ was in an even more precarious position. Although at times Kazan’ was able to wage war against Muscovy on a more or less equal footing, essentially Kazan’ was in an


intermediate frontier zone between Muscovy, the Siberian Khanate, the Great Horde, and the Crimean Khanate. Nor was the Kazan’ Khanate able to constitute a core area of its own. Ironically, this intermediate position, which gave the Kazan’ Khanate its viability as a commercial power, also made it vulnerable to military attack from one or a combination of the surrounding minor powers. Of these, only Muscovy was able eventually to establish itself as a true core area.

Although Suleyman had claimed Kazan’ as his yurt, neither the Ottoman Empire nor Safavid Persia, both of which were core areas, was in a position to affect Kazan’-Muscovite relations directly. The Great Horde was only a remnant of the erstwhile core area, the Qipchaq Khanate, but it was still, at least until 1502, the nominal suzerain of Muscovy. And in its reincarnation as the Astrakhan’ Khanate, it continued to receive tribute from Muscovy, as did the other successor khanates. As long as the Kazan’ Khanate remained favorable to Muscovy or at least neutral but independent, the Muscovite ruler could feel relatively secure concerning Muscovy’s eastern border. If Kazan’ fell under the direct influence of one of the other neighboring states, then it became part of that state’s proximate frontier zone, the intermediate zone was shifted closer to Moscow, and the proximate zone of Muscovy, that is the area that stretched along the Volga and Oka rivers from Nizhnii Novgorod to Serpukhov, would become

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52 For a discussion of the Kazan’ Khanate’s commercial importance during this period, and how it affected relations with Muscovy, see Janet Martin, “Muscovite Relations with the Khanates of Kazan’ and the Crimea (1460s to 1521),” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, vol. 17, 1983, pp. 437–442, 446–447.

53 See the Testament of Ivan III (1504) where he specifies the amount of tribute to be paid to each khanate in *Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel’nykh kniazei XIV–XVI vv.*, ed. L. V. Cherepnin, Moscow and Leningrad: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1950, p. 362.
the ultimate zone of another neighboring state. Kazan’ could then be used as an advance base for an attack on Moscow. From the point of view of the Kazan’ ruling class, it meant playing one powerful neighbor off against another in order to optimize protection from hostile takeover while minimizing interference by the protecting power. The policy worked insofar as it delayed a final conquest until 1552.

In 1502, the Khan of Crimea Mengli Girey had taken over the Great Horde. That polity then reemerged as the Astrakhan’ Khanate, never strong enough to become a core area, and remained outside Muscovite influence until 1556 when Ivan IV conquered it using Kazan’ as the staging area for his army. Under Mehmed Girey, the son and successor of Mengli Girey as Crimean khan, relations between the Crimean Khanate and Muscovy deteriorated.

When Mehmed Emin died in 1518, he had no son. His younger brother, Abdüllâtif, who had once been khan and who would be the logical successor had died the previous year. Supposedly, if Kudai Kul had remained Muslim, he would have been in a position to claim the throne at this time and gain the support of the Kazan’ quriltai and qarači beys. If Vasilii III contemplated a “dynastic union” of Kazan’ with Muscovy, as Pelenski suggested, it could not now be implemented because Evdokhiia was no longer living and Kudai Kul/Peter’s marriage with her had produced no male heirs. Instead, Vasilii III arranged to have one of the Tatar princes residing in Muscovy, the thirteen-year-old Shah Ali (Shigalei), installed. Shah Ali was

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55 *PSRL*, vol. 6, p. 260; vol. 8, p. 263; vol. 13, p. 28; vol. 20, p. 393; vol. 26, p. 308; vol. 28, p. 354.
directly related to the Astrakhan’ khan, and a coalition among Muscovy, Kazan’, and Astrakhan’ was now a real threat.\(^{56}\) This arrangement was not agreeable to Mehmed Girey, as he had warned Ivan before the death of Mehmed Emin: “And we have decided that if anything happens to Mehmed Emin we will make Sahip Girey khan of that yurt. And if it should happen that someone coming from another yurt establishes himself as khan, you, my brother grand prince, will be in trouble (в истоме будешь) and things will not go well between us.”\(^{57}\) But he could do nothing about his dissatisfaction with Vasilii’s move at the time because the Kazan’ magnates accepted Shah Ali.\(^{58}\) Three years later, however, in 1521, the Kazan’ magnates turned against Shah Ali, and Mehmed Girey took the opportunity to support his brother, Sahip Girey, for the throne of Kazan’. The Kazan’ Khanate now became the proximate frontier zone of the Crimean Khanate, not exactly part of Mehmed Girey’s yurt as he declared but close enough.\(^{59}\) He besieged Moscow the same year.

Keenan sees Sahip Girey’s accession to the throne as solely an attempt on the part of the local Kazanian princes “to retain their independence of their larger neighbors,” and he argues

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\(^{57}\) _SRIO_, vol. 95, no. 30, p. 520.


\(^{59}\) _SRIO_, vol. 95, no. 38, p. 679. Mehmed Girey could legitimately make the claim that Kazan’ was his yurt because his mother had been married to two Kazan’ khans.
against the idea that Mehmed Girey had anything to do with it. This view would seem to be contradicted by Mehmed Girey’s message to the khan of Astrakhan’ that, at that time, the Kazan’ princes “sent a man to me asking for a sultan, and I have sent them a sultan.” Yet, Mehmed Girey may have misrepresented what had occurred to neutralize the Astrakhan’ khan’s support of Muscovy. And if the Kazan’ princes were indeed trying to adopt an independent policy vis-à-vis the Muscovite grand prince, they may have miscalculated the effect choosing the Crimean khan’s brother would have (i.e., Mehmed Girey’s claiming Kazan’ was his yurt).

Although Mehmed Girey warned Vasilii before the demise of Mehmed Emin not to place anyone other than Sahip Girey on the throne and although Mehmed Girey claimed that he was responsible for putting his brother on the throne in 1521, we have a much better explanation of events if we understand that the initiative came from the ruling elite of Kazan’. For one thing, it explains why Mehmed Girey waited three years after Vasilii put Shah Ali on the throne of Kazan’ to take any action. He could not do so with any hope of success until an opportunity such as this arose when he would not encounter local Kazanian resistance. According to a report that Vasilii received at the time, Mehmed Girey was “wary of the [Ottoman] Turks, and having much discord with the Shirins,”62 so he was in no position to overcome any extended opposition there. Also, if one looks at it from the viewpoint of the Kazan’ princes, their choosing the brother of the Crimean khan would seem to offer an optimum solution. At that point, they have to have been

61 SRIO, vol. 95, no. 38, p. 679.
62 SRIO, vol. 95, no. 37, p. 668. The Shirins were a powerful clan in both the Crimean and Kazan’ khanates.
more worried about the Muscovite grand prince to the west and the Siberian khan to the east, both of whom had attacked and taken Kazan’ previously, something the Crimean khan had not done to that point. If Kazan’ was again attacked by either Muscovy or Sibir’, the Kazan’ princes could ask Sahip’s brother to help protect Kazan’. What they most likely did not count on was Mehmed Girey’s taking their acceptance of his brother for khan as an opportunity to declare that Kazan’ was his yurt and to use Kazan’ as a staging area for an attack on Moscow. It was against this attack that Vasilii III called on Kudai Kul/Peter to lead the defenses of the city, which he did successfully. The siege was lifted, but only after Muscovy agreed to pay an annual tribute (uluğ khaźîne) to Mehmed Girey.

Two years later, Kudai Kul/Peter died and was buried in the Arkhangel’skii sobor, the only brother-in-law of a grand prince to be interred there. Of the 49 sarcophagi on the main floor of the Cathedral, 45 contain the remains of 51 grand princes and princes of the ruling family, 2 contain unidentified remains, and 2 contain the remains of Kazan’ tsareviches who converted to Christianity—Kudai Kul/Peter and Ötemish Girey/Alexander. The latter had been named khan of Kazan’ as a baby in 1549 under the regency of his mother Süyün Bike. In 1551, when Ivan

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63 A parallel situation occurred 82 years earlier, in 1439, when Iurii Patrikeevich, brother-in-law of then grand prince Vasilii II, led a successful defense of Moscow against Ulu Mehmed. See above, fn. 21.


65 PSRL, vol. 13, p. 157; vol. 20, p. 475; vol. 29, pp. 56, 155; see also Khudiakov, Ocherki po istorii Kazanskogo khanstva, p. 116. The chronicles say he became khan at the age
IV attacked Kazan for the third time, Ötemish was brought as a prisoner to Moscow, where he was baptized by Metropolitan Makarii on January 8, 1553, and Ivan took him under his wing. Ötemish/Alexander died on June 11, 1566, aged 17 years 6 months, which is when Ivan had his body interred in the Arkhangel’skii sobor. The precedent for the burial of the remains of a converted Tatar tsarevich in the Cathedral would have been Kudai Kul/Peter’s burial there in 1523 by Vasilii III. The significance of these burials is that these two Tatar tsareviches, as a result of their close relationships with the Muscovite rulers, at their deaths were accorded the honor of being considered equal in status to the males of the ruling family, in other words, princes of the blood. This was an honor that, in the case of Kudai Kul/Peter, went beyond a familial relationship by marriage.

We have no evidence that Kudai Kul/Peter’s Tatar ancestry was held against him in any way. To the contrary, we can suppose that the Church had no reservations about such an interment. By contrast with steppe societies where fictional kinship was the basis of legitimation, in Muscovy conversion to Christianity was the legitimizer at least among the ruling class. Thus, Tatar princes who converted and crossed over into Muscovite service were given positions that in some degree corresponded to their former status in the steppe.

What then was Kudai Kul/Peter’s legacy? As with anyone else in Muscovy, we have to

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Figure 2
look at his family relations (see Figure 2). Evdokhiia and Kudai Kul/Peter had two daughters, both named Anastasia.\(^{68}\) The first Anastasia married Prince Fedor Mikhailovich Mstislavskii on June 11, 1530,\(^{69}\) and was the mother of Ivan Fedorovich Mstislavskii, who later headed the Boyar Council of the Zemshchina. She died on December 17, 1540.\(^{70}\) The second Anastasia married the regent Vasilii Vasil’evich Shuiskii on June 6, 1538,\(^{71}\) and was the mother of Marfa Vasil’evna Shuiskaia, who in turn married Prince Ivan Dmitrievich Bel’skii on November 8, 1555.\(^{72}\) The Mstislavskiis, Shuiskiis, and Bel’skiis were three of the most prominent and powerful families in Muscovy during this time. The Shuiskiis and Bel’skiis were rivals, and it was politically prudent for newcomers to the ruling class to marry into rival family constellations, for which they could act as mediators. When the marriage of Marfa took place, the Razriadnaia kniga identified her not only as the daughter of V. V. Shuiskii but as “the granddaughter through


\(^{71}\) PSRL, vol. 13, pp. 123–124; vol. 29, p. 32; “Pravlenie tsaria Ivana Vasil’evicha,” p. 120. The Piskarevskii letopisets refers to this daughter as “Anna.” PSRL, vol. 34, p. 178 and “Piskarevskii letopisets,” p. 49.

her mother” (девушка по матери) of Tsarevich Peter. This wording indicates that at that date being the granddaughter of a tsarevich carried higher status than being a Shuiskii.

In 1565, Ivan IV formed the **Oprichnina** in imitation of a Tatar khanate, and in 1572, another Crimean Tatar attack on Moscow contributed to the decision of Ivan IV to abandon the **Oprichnina**. Ivan ostensibly blamed the **Zemshchina** for the debacle, demoting its head, Prince Ivan Fedorovich Mstislavskii, to *namestnik* (governor) of Novgorod after he “confessed” to collusion with Devlet Girey, the Crimean khan. Prince Mstislavskii was the grandson of Kudai Kul/Peter and Evdokhiia Ivanovna, and therefore one-quarter Tatar. He could not claim Chingizid (white bone) descent, however, because the connection with Kudai Kul was through his mother, Anastasiia. Mstislavskii had married Irina Gorbataia, whose father Alexander and brother Peter were subsequently killed by the **Oprichnina** in 1565. The daughter of Ivan Mstislavskii and Irina Gorbataia, also named Anastasiia, in 1573 married Simeon Bekbulatovich, who was the nephew of Ivan IV’s second wife, Mariia Temriukovna. Ivan’s own mother, Elena Hlinska (Glinskaia) was a descendant of Mamai, emir and opponent of Dmitrii Donskoi.

Although Ivan abolished the **Oprichnina** in 1572, he did not give up his Tatar orientation. He then appointed the recently baptized Astrakhan’ tsarevich Mikhail Kaibulich to head the

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73 Razriadnaia kniga 1475–1605 gg., vol. 1, p. 479.


75“Piskarevskii letopisets,” p. 82; PSRL, vol. 34, p. 192.

76 Józef Wolff, Kniaziowie Litewsko-ruscy od końca czternastego wieku, Warsaw, Skład główny w księgarni Gebethnera i Wolffa, 1895, pp. 77–86.
newly recombined Boyar Council.\textsuperscript{77} In 1575, he declared Simeon Bekbulatovich to be the grand prince of all Rus’, a position Simeon ostensibly held for a year in a crude parody of steppe political-genealogical relations. Normal steppe relations had been for Chingizid khans (tsars) to have sovereignty over non-Chingizid princes, as the Qipchaq khan had sovereignty over the Muscovite grand prince. The parody was for a non-Chingizid tsar/khan (Ivan IV) to have sovereignty over a Chingizid prince (Simeon Bekbulatovich). In steppe terms, Ivan’s claim to be a tsar/khan was legitimated by his conquests of Kazan’ (1552) and Astrakhan’ (1556), not his being crowned tsar/basileus by the Church in a Byzantine-based ceremony in 1547. Ivan IV’s being called a Chingizid by the Nogai \textit{mirza} Belek Bulat in 1551\textsuperscript{78} was indicative of the confusion created by having the Muscovite ruler conduct steppe diplomacy as a non-Chingizid Christian khan, the “\textit{belyi tsar}.”

Although Kudai Kul/Peter’s daughters, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren married prominently, he could not found a family, in political terms, because he had no sons. Otherwise, his heritage in Russian history might have been greater.

The career of Kudai Kul/Peter is an example, although a rather sensational one, of how, once elite Tatar émigrés met the Church’s requirement by converting to Orthodox Christianity, they were accepted with full honors and without any visible discrimination or penalty into the Muscovite service and political marriage system.\textsuperscript{79} Even when they did not convert to Orthodox

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{SRIO}, vol. 129, no. 15, pp. 219, 221, 224–226, and no. 16, p. 228.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Prodolzhenie Drevnei Rossiiiskoi vivioki}, vol. 8, 1793, pp. 316–317.

\textsuperscript{79} Hellie has commented on this apparent “instantaneous” acceptance of foreigners into the Muscovite political system upon their conversion. Richard Hellie, \textit{Slavery in Russia 1450–1725}, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp. 392–393.
\end{footnotesize}
Christianity, steppe nobility who paid allegiance to the tsar were accorded the respect due their rank. The seventeenth-century official Grigorii Kotoshikhin tells us that Siberian and Kasimov tsareviches, that is Chingizids, held a higher place of honor (cheest’) than boyars in the Muscovite court.80 One of the daughters of Tsar Aleksei was betrothed to the Kasimov prince Seyid-Burkhan upon his conversion.81 In the second half of the seventeenth century, Natalia Naryshkina, descended from a minor noble family of the Crimean Khanate,82 married Tsar Aleksei and not only was the mother of Peter I but also for a time during Peter’s minority served as regent.

Kudai Kul/Peter’s and Ötemish/Alexander’s respective burials in the Archangel Cathedral were not the only examples of converted Tatar émigrés who were honored by the Church. Tales of Church provenance speak favorably of such converts. Peter Ordynskii, who converted in Rostov in the late thirteenth century and was considered a saint by the Muscovite Church by 1610, is described in The Life of Peter, Tsarevich of the Horde as better morally than the local Rus’ prince.83 And in the late sixteenth century, monks of the Kostroma Monastery compiled a genealogy showing the descent of their patron, Boris Godunov, from a Tatar emir, Chet-Murza (Zakhariia), who converted in the early fourteenth century. Although Baskakov accepted the legitimacy of the genealogy, Veselovskii expressed doubts of the authenticity of the

82 Baskakov, Russkie familiyi tiurkskogo proiskhodzeniia, pp. 101–103.
genealogical connection and of the existence of Chet-Murza himself.\textsuperscript{84} In any event, the name “Godunov” itself seems to be one of Tatar origin.\textsuperscript{85} Even if the ancestral connection is a legend, it nonetheless demonstrates the high regard that elite Tatar ancestry held in Muscovite political culture. Those Tatar converts of lower social status, however, were treated differently and often subjected to being abused by provincial officials.\textsuperscript{86} Later, in the nineteenth century, we find the development of a general perception among many Russians that the Asiatic represented the barbaric while the European represented the civilized. In the sources regarding Kudai Kul/Peter and other émigrés from the Tatar elite, we do not find evidence of any such distinction. The anti-Tatar ideology that the Church was developing from the second half of the fifteenth century on\textsuperscript{87} does not seem to have affected the secular administration’s attitude toward elite Tatars, nor does it seem to have yet been applied to recent Tatar converts at the time. In that world, horizontal social linkages bound members of different aristocracies more strongly together than any ethnic differences could separate them.


\textsuperscript{85} Baskakov, \textit{Russkie familii tiurskogo proiskhozhdeniia}, pp. 57–58.

